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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

THE STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

v.

:

BRANDON LEE SANDOVAL,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

Case No. 20080419-CA

:

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This is an appeal from a judgment of conviction for one count each of Aggravated
Burglary, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-6-202 (2003) and
76-6-203 (2003), Theft, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6404 (2003), and Criminal Mischief, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann.
§ 76-6-106 (2003), in the Third Judicial District Court, in and for Salt Lake County, State
of Utah, the Honorable Randall Skanchy presiding. Jurisdiction is conferred upon this
Court by Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)G) (Supp. 2008). See Addendum A (Sentence,
Judgment, Commitment).
ISSUE, STANDARD OF REVIEW, AND PRESERVATION
Issue: Whether, in a case where the eyewitness testimony was the only direct
evidence linking Sandoval to the burglary, the trial court improperly commented on the
evidence by instructing the jury that "[a] conviction can be based on the uncorroborated

testimony of a single eyewitness." R. 106; 163.
Standard of Review: This Court will '"review the trial court's determination
concerning jury instructions for correctness and accord it no particular deference.'" State
v. Hobbs, 2003 UT App 27,}] 10, 64 P.3d 1218 (citation omitted); see also State v.
Tuckctl, 2000 UT App 295, \I, 13 P.3d 1060 ("'The standard of review for jury
instructions to which counsel has objected is correctness.'" (citation omitted)).
Preservation: This issue is preserved at R. 233:282-85; 234:5-6, where Sandoval
objected to the proposed instruction and the trial court overruled Sandoval's objection.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
The following constitutional provisions and rules decide the issue on appeal:
United States Constitution Amendment XIV (due process); Utah Constitution Article I,
Section 7 (due process); Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 19 (jury instructions). Their
text is provided in full in Addendum B.
STATEMENT OF CASE
Sandoval was charged with one count each of Aggravated Burglary, a first degree
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-6-202 (2003) and 76-6-203 (2003); Theft, a
second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (2003); and Criminal
Mischief, a class A misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-106 (2003). R.
2-4. Following a preliminary hearing on February 9, 2007, Sandoval was bound over for
trial. R. 18-19; 21; 231:48-49. Based on the preliminary hearing testimony, the State
amended count III, Criminal Mischief, to a third degree felony. R. 24-25; 26-27; 241:49.
2

A jury trial for Sandoval and his co-defendant, Joshua Phillips, was held on
February 13-15, 19,2008. R. 78-79; 114-15; 116-17; 232-35. The State asked the trial
court to give the following instruction to the jury: "A conviction can be based on the
uncorroborated testimony of a single eyewitness." R. 106; see Addendum C. Sandoval
objected. R. 233:282; 234:6. He argued that the instruction was inappropriate because it
"puts undue emphasis" on Creed Law's eyewitness testimony and "suggests to the jury
that the Court has sufficient belief in Creed Law." R. 233:282-83. This "may cause the
jury to give undue weight to [Creed's) testimony." R. 233:283. It is also "duplicative"
because the stock instruction "tells the jury, among other things, that they can believe the
testimony of one witness over many." R. 233:282-83. The trial court said that it was
"inclined to keep [the proposed instruction] out because we have an instruction that goes
to the one witnesses against many or many against one." R. 233:285. We also "have our
standard stock which is usually provided associated with the identification instruction."
R. 233:285. Regardless, the trial court took the matter under advisement. R. 233:285.
After considering the matter overnight, the trial court overruled Sandoval's
objection. R. 233:285; 234:5. Explaining, the trial court said that the instruction was
"supported by case law," specifically State v. Spencer, 497 P.2d 636 (Utah 1972), "and
appears to be good law in the State of Utah." R. 234:5. "In addition, in view of the
length and nature of the identification - identification of witness deliberations the jury
should go through in terms of calculating how to treat identification witnesses, it seems
proper in the context of those other two instructions which we have." R. 234:5.
3

Sandoval renewed his objection based on his previous statements. R. 234:6.
Thereafter, the trial court gave the proposed instruction to the jury as Instruction
56. R. 163; 234:6. Additionally, the trial court instructed the jury:
As each witness testifies, you must decide how accurate that
testimony is. It may help you to ask yourself questions such as these:
Personal Interest. Does the witness have a personal interest in how
the trial comes out?
Other Bias. Docs the witness have some other bias or motive to
testify a certain way?
Demeanor: What impression is made by the witness's appearance
and conduct while answering questions?
Consistency. Did the witness make conflicting statements or
contradict other evidence?
Knowledge and Memory. Did the witness have a good opportunity
to know the facts and the ability to remember them?
Reasonableness. Is the testimony reasonable in light of human
experience?
You're not required to believe all that a witness says. You are
entitled to believe one witness as against many or many as against one, in
accordance with your honest convictions.
R. 129; 234:6; see Addendum C.
It also gave a Long instruction:
An important question in this case is the identification of the
defendant as the person who committed the crime. The prosecution has the
burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt, not only that the crime was
committed, but also that the defendant was the person who committed the
crime. If, after considering the evidence you have heard from both sides,
you arc not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is the
person who committed the crime, you must find the defendant not guilty.
The identification testimony that you have heard was an expression
of belief or impression by the witness. To find the defendant not guilty,
you need not believe that the identification witness was not insincere, but
merely that the witness was mistaken in his or her belief or impression.
Many factors affect the accuracy of identification. In considering
whether the prosecution has proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the
4

defendant is the person who committed the crime, you should consider the
following:
1. Did the witness have an adequate opportunity to observe the
criminal actor? In answering this question, you should consider:
(a) the length of time the witness observed the actor;
(b) the distance between the witness and the actor;
(c) the light or lack of light at the place and time of observation!";]
(d) the presence or absence of distracting noises or activity during
the observation;
(e) any other circumstance affecting the opportunity of the witness to
observe the person committing the crime.
2. Did the witness have the capacity to observe the person
committing the crime? In answering this question, you should consider
whether the capacity of the witness was impaired by:
(a) stress or fright at the time of observation;
(b) personal motivations, biases or prejudices;
(c) fatigue or injury.
3. Whether the witness is of a different race than the criminal actor.
Identification by a person of a different race may be less reliable than
identification by a person of the same race.
4. Was the identification of the defendant by the witness completely
the product of the witness' own memory? In answering this question, you
should consider:
(a) the length of time that passed between the original observation of
the witness and the identification of the defendant by the witness;
(b) the mental capacity and state of mind of the witness at the time
of the identificationf;]
(c) the exposure of the witness to opinions, to photographs, or to any
other information or influence that may have affected the independence of
the identification of the defendant by the witness;
(d) any instance when the witness failed to identify the defendant;
(e) any instances when the witness gave a description of the actor
that is inconsistent with the defendant's appearance;
(f) the circumstances under which the defendant was presented to the
witness for identification.
You may take into account that an identification made by picking the
defendant from a group of similar individuals is generally more reliable
than an identification made from the defendant being presented alone to the
witness.
You may also take into account that identifications made from
seeing the person are generally more reliable than identifications made
5

from a photograph.

R. 164-66; see Addendum C.
During closing rebuttal, the State admitted that its investigation in this case was
"less than perfect." R. 234:45. But it argued that the jury should convict despite the
deficient investigation because the police are "not on trial" and "we have good
identification, good solid identification." R. 234:47. It then highlighted and read
Instruction 56. 11.234:47-48. 'This is the instruction, fail proof. And that's the law." R.
234:48. "Here we have a single eyewitness identification. Of course, you got to say: Is
that identification credible? Is that identification good? Yeah. That's the law
instructions for you. But like I said, the evidence supports every single thing how this
thing happened. Identification is solid, okay." 11.234:48,54. "On top of all those
coincidences, the icing on the cake is ID here. Sometimes the icing is better than the
cake. ID here, you can't dispute that. There is ID. There is a law a telling you there is,
that's good testimony." R. 234:48. "But we have no evidence at all, no evidence at all,
no evidence to contradict Creed Law's testimony, okay." R. 234:56. "And Creed Law's
testimony is the solid testimony we need to consider here, okay. And . . . he encountered
them. And with all the coincidences, with the ID, like I said, icing on the cake, okay." R.
234:56.
The trial court excused the jury to deliberate at 11:20 a.m. R. 116; 234:57. At
1:50 p.m., the jury asked its first question during deliberation: "Where arc the outside
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lights in the yard where the fight was located?" R. 234:58. The trial court responded that
the jury must rely upon the evidence or lack of evidence provided in court. R. 234:58.
At 4:07 p.m., the jury asked a second question: "Do we have to consider any of the
factors for which there is no evidence?" R. 234:59, 61. The trial court determined that
this question related to "the identification instructions." R. 234:65. The trial court
answered, "You should consider the totality of the evidence and apply it to the factors
and give what weight it deserves, if any. To the extent you find no evidence as to a
factor, you need not consider that factor in your deliberations." R. 234:69. At 5:00 p.m.,
the trial court excused the jury for the weekend. R. 116; 234:69-70.
On Monday at 9:00 a.m., the trial court announced to counsel that it had two new
questions from the jury.1 R. 235:3-4. The first question was: "Can lack of evidence be
considered when substantiating doubt?" The second question was: "If there is doubt are
we or are we not required to give the defendants the benefit of the doubt?" The trial
court's answer to both questions was: "Your instructions associated with reasonable
doubt are the instructions you should refer to in answering this question." R. 235:4. The
trial court then gave a verdict-urging instruction. R. 11 8; 167; 235:4-5.
I am going to ask that you continue your deliberations. I have
prepared a few additional comments that I would like you to consider as
you do so.
Those for conviction ought seriously to ask themselves again, and
most thoughtfully, whether they do not have a reason to doubt the
correctness of a judgment that is not shared by one or more of their fellow
The jury's written questions are included in the record but are not numbered, fhey are
attached to the left-hand side of the record's red folder.
7

jurors, and whether they should distrust the weight and sufficiency of
evidence that has failed to convince one or more of their fellow jurors
beyond a reasonable doubt. And those for acquittal ought seriously to ask
themselves again, and most thoughtfully, whether the doubt in their mind is
a reasonable one since it appears to make no effective impression upon the
minds of one or more equally conscientious fellow jurors, who bear the
same responsibility, serve under the same oath, and have heard the same
evidence with, we may assume, the same attention to detail and desire to
arrive at the truth.
You should, however, all bear in mind at all times that no juror is
expected to, or should, yield a conscientious conviction that he or she may
have as to the weight of the evidence. But, it is your duty to reach a verdict
if you can do so without surrendering your conscientious conviction.
1 will now ask that you retire once again and continue your
deliberations with these additional comments in mind and that you apply
them in conjunction with the instructions that I have previously given to
you. You may be as leisurely in your deliberations as the occasion may
require and should take all the time that you feel may be necessary.
R. 167. The jury then resumed its deliberation. R. 118; 235:6. At 12:35 p.m., it returned
"a verdict of guilty on all counts." R. 118; 168-69; 235:6.
On April 17, 2008, the trial court held a sentencing hearing. R. 190-92; 230. It
sentenced Sandoval to concurrent terms of five years to life for the aggravated burglary
conviction; one to fifteen years for the theft conviction; and zero to five years for the
criminal mischief conviction. R. 190-91; 235:9-11. It then suspended the prison terms,
ordered Sandoval to serve 365 days in jail with credit for time served, and placed him on
probation for thirty-six months. R. 190-92; 235:9-11. Sandoval filed a timely notice of
appeal. R. 193.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
A.

November 3, 2006.

Creed Law met Brandon Sandoval and Joshua Phillips, the co-defendant, on the
evening of November 3, 2006. R. 232:43. That night, Creed and his friend, David
Brown, went to a bar to have "a good time and go shoot some pool/' R. 232:43. There,
they "ran into some friends" and "mingled with everybody," R. 232:43-44. When the
bar closed, Creed decided to invite "a few people" to his parents' house to "play some
more pool/' R. 232:44.
Creed's parents were away on vacation, but Porter, Creed's brother, who was
living in his parents' attic bedroom at the time, was home. R. 232:44; 233:54, 60. Creed
went to his parents' house first to turn "the lights on" and "make sure'" Porter was "okay"
with having "some people over." R. 232:44-45, 84; 233:210.
That night, approximately ten people visited the Law residence. R. 232:44, 141.
Of those, Creed did not know five people: David's girlfriend Heidi Jones, Heidi's mom,
Heidi's mom's boyfriend, Heidi's "really good friend| |" Phillips, and Phillips' friend
Sandoval. R. 232:44-45; 233:31, 47-48. Sandoval and Phillips did not own a car so
David drove them to the Law residence. R. 233:32, 209, The Law residence was located
in a confusing neighborhood. R. 233:36. Unless a person knew the way, as David did, it
was difficult to find. R. 233:36-37.
Heidi testified that Creed met Sandoval and Phillips at the bar and gave them
permission to come to his parents' house. R. 233:35. Creed, on the other hand, testified
9

that he did not meet Sandoval and Phillips until they arrived at his parents' house. R.
232:67. lie said that he was immediately uncomfortable with them because they "were
wearing clothes" that he "affiliated with gangs." R. 232:68-69. Specifically, Sandoval
was wearing a black cap, a navy blue T-shirt, and jeans. R. 232:69-70. And Phillips was
wearing a whitc-and-blue "South Carolina jacket," warm-up pants, a blue bandanna, and
untied hiking boots. R. 232:69-72. Creed did not want Sandoval and Phillips at his
parents* house, but he did not ask them to leave because he did not want "any kind of
retaliation for . . . showing some sort of prejudice towards" them. R. 232:77, 91.
Creed and his visitors first mingled on the main level of the house

in the kitchen

and sunroom. R. 232:48, 129-30; 233:56. Then, at Porter's request, they went
downstairs to the game room. R. 232:48, 130; 233:56. There, they watched television
and "played pool and some pinball." R. 232:45, 49, 130. During the evening, the visitors
occasionally went outside through a backdoor on the main level to smoke in the
backyard. R. 232:81-82, 85, 130; 233:90. But, except on one occasion, the visitors did
not venture upstairs or into the bedrooms. R. 233:56-57, 60-62.
The one occasion when visitors went upstairs was when Creed took Heidi and
Heidi's mother on a tour of the home. R. 232:82-83, 144; 233:58. They visited all of the
rooms, including the master bedroom. R. 232:82-83, 144; 233:58. Creed recalled that
the tour occurred at the end of the party. R. 232:82, But David and Heidi recalled that
the tour was at the beginning of the party. R. 233: 28-29, 38, 211.
Throughout the evening, Creed kept an eye on Sandoval and Phillips. R. 233:221.
10

He testified that he thought Sandoval and Phillips "didn't fit in" with the other visitors.
R. 232:78. They were "[sjcowling," giving "one word answers," and "not interacting."
R. 232:78, 80. Plus, he felt like they "were giving [him] the evil eye a bit." R. 232:79.
Creed never saw Sandoval or Phillips "go upstairs to the bedrooms." R. 232:84,
89-91. Once, however, when he "went up and got a drink of water," Creed saw
"Sandoval by the front door just kind of poking around." R. 232:84, 89-91. lie "looked
like he was lost," like he had "missed the stairway or something." R. 232:85, 126. So
Creed "showed him the way down to the basement." R. 232:85.
At some point during the evening, Creed and David played pool against Sandoval
and Phillips. R. 232:50, 88; 233:212-13, 225. While they were playing, Creed told
David about his plan to go dirt biking the next day. R. 232:50, 88; 233:212, 225.
Originally, he said that it was going to be an overnight trip. R. 232:143; 233:213. David
also recalled mentioning that Creed's parents were on vacation. R. 233:220. Toward the
end of the evening, Porter came down and told Creed "to wrap it up because [they]
needed to go riding tomorrow." R. 232:50; 233:63-64.
The visitors left at about 3:00 a.m. R. 232:49; 233:216. David drove Sandoval
and Phillips home. R. 233:222. At that time of night it took David ten to fifteen minutes
to drive from the Law residence to Phillips' house. R. 233:216. To thank David for the
ride, Sandoval and Phillips bought him breakfast. R. 233:222.
B.

November 4, 2006.
As planned, Creed and Porter went "dirt biking" from 12:00 to 6:00 p.m. on
11

November 4. R. 232:35-36. At 9:00 p.m., Creed returned to his parents' house to help
Porter clean the bikes. R. 232:34-35, 92. Creed testified that it was dark that night, but
that he believed there was a full moon. R. 232:97. Aaron Hall, who lived 75 or 100
yards away, testified that it was "completely dark" at 9:00 p.m. that night. R. 233:119.
Creed pulled his truck into the driveway and saw a person "crouched" behind
"some bushes" and "poking" his head out. R. 232:36, 93-96. When Creed exited his
truck, the person ran away. R. 232:36. Thinking the person was Porter playing a trick on
him, Creed "ran around the front of the house" to the backyard. R. 232:36, 93. Creed
testified that the backyard was well lit. R. 232:62, 127. He said that "fcjvcry light pretty
much in the house was on," including lights by the backdoors, two sets of flood lights "in
the eaves," and a "motion detector light" on the "front of the shop." R. 232:61-62, 127.
In the backyard, Creed "was confronted by two individuals." R. 232:37. Both
were wearing "dark pants, black hoodies." R. 232:72-73. He could not say what type of
pants or shoes they were wearing because "it all happened very, very rapidly." R.
232:73-74. The first person was "crouched down" like "a line backer." R. 232:39-40,
99-100. The second person was "approximately 10 feet behind him." R. 232:38, 101.
This "struck |Creed) as odd" so he "just tackled" the first person. R. 232:40, 97, 101.
Creed explained during direct examination: "I didn't know who it was, and it
obviously wasn't [PorterJ because he was supposed to be home alone. And so I just
tackled him and start[cd] wrestling him at that point." R. 232:40. They wrestled for
fifteen-to-twenty seconds and "wound up" with their upper bodies "in the bushes." R.
12

232:41, 98. Creed and the person were both on their baeks and the person "was on top of
[Creed]." 11.232:41,98-99. Creed "wrapped [the person] up into a headlock." R.
232:40-41, 74. While they were "cheek to cheek," Creed recognized the person as
Sandoval. R. 232:40-41, 97. Creed's story changed during cross-examination. R.
232:97, 139. On cross-examination, Creed testified that he "recognized" Sandoval as he
"was running towards him." R. 232:97. He also testified that he recognized Sandoval
and Phillips "|a]s soon as |hc] saw them." R. 232:139.
While Creed and the first person were in the bushes, the second person
approached, pulled "something out of his shirt," and pointed it at Creed. R. 232:41, 10305. The second person was wearing a hood, but Creed "could see his face quite well"
and recognized him as Phillips. R. 232:42-43, 121. Believing the second person had a
gun, Creed stopped wrestling and "said, 'Take what you want.'" R. 232:41, 105-07. The
first person "started standing up" and then Creed "hear[d] a 'pop.'" R. 232:41, 107-08.
The two people then "bolt[ed]." R. 232:107. Creed was "in shock." R. 232:109. He
was afraid that he had been "shot at," so he played "dead" and "waited for quite a little
while." R. 232:42, 109-10. When he did not hear the people anymore, he called 911 on
his cell phone. R. 232:42, 111.
Eventually, Creed stood up and met Porter "coming out the backdoor." R. 232:51,
112-13. Porter testified that he had been in his bedroom and had slept through the entire
incident. R. 232:131; 233:65, 108, lie said that he heard "some banging" downstairs
while he was asleep and noticed that the family dog left his bedroom, but he did not
13

investigate because he believed that it was Creed making the noise. R. 233:65-67, 93.
Porter grew suspicious when he heard Creed's "really loud" truck approach and realized
that Creed was not in the house. R. 233:65, 67, 108. As Porter dressed to investigate, he
heard a sound "like a gunshot." R. 233:68, 99. lie then "went downstairs pretty quickly"
and "met up with Creed" outside. R. 233:69.
Creed "was pretty hysterical." R. 233:70, 100. He said, " ; We just got robbed and
I was shot at/" R. 232:51, 113; 233:70. Creed and Porter then "went straight up to the
upstairs master bedroom" to get a gun. R. 232:53, 114; 233:71-72. On the way, Creed
noticed that the "sliding glass door in the sunroom [was] open." R. 232:51. This was
"very unusual" because no one "ever used that door." R. 232:51-52. A pet door was
installed in the door that "prevented] it from contacting the latch," so Creed's parents
placed "a block of wood" behind the door "to hold it shut." R. 232:51, 122-25. Officers
later found the block of wood behind a nearby desk. R. 232:123.
Upstairs, Creed told Porter that he recognized the burglars as "two of the
gentlemen that were at the party the night before." R. 233:73. At Porter's instruction,
Creed called 911 from the landline telephone and called David to get Sandoval's and
Phillips' contact information. R. 232:53, 114; 233:73-74. Then, Porter went "through
the house." checking the doors and turning off the lights. R. 233:74, 100. He too noticed
that the sliding door was "slightly ajar" and that the board securing it "had been
removed." R. 233:78.
Two areas in the home were affected by the burglary- the master bedroom and
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the front closet. R. 232:142. Everything was pulled out of the closets. R. 233:237.
Additionally, in the master bedroom, the burglars broke the television off the wall. R.
232:131; 233:232; see State's Exhibits 12, 13. It appeared that they broke it off the wall
by holding onto the banister and jumping "up and down on [the] TV." R. 233:232. In
the process, they also broke "a spindle off the banister. R. 233:232.
C.

The Investigation.
On the night of the incident, Officer Richard Ashby was the initial reporting

officer. R. 233:126, 133. He testified that officers found a bag with zip-ties in it and "[a]
bullet casing in the yard" and "observed some damage to the hedge." R. 233:130-31,
133. Additionally, he noted that the "area where the confrontation occurred was not
lighted and very dark." R. 233:134.
Officer Dennis Knudsen, a crime scene technician, dusted for fingerprints in areas
that "seemed to be disturbed." R. 233:141-42. He lifted one fingerprint from the broken
banister. R. 233:142. He checked the fingerprint against Sandoval, Phillips, and Mr. and
Mrs. Law, but he did not find a match, R. 233:143. He did not check the fingerprint
against Creed or Porter. R. 233:150. Officer Knudsen also found shoe prints on the
television. R. 233:149. It is "a good assumption" that someone was standing on the
television and supporting himself with the banister and "that's how the dowel was
broken." R. 233:149. But he believed that the prints were not good enough to test. R.
233:157. He never saw any footprints outside. R. 233:158.
Porter testified that the police who responded that night did not appear to know
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"who was in charge." R. 233:79. He and Creed told the story "three or four times," but
the officers did not take them "seriously" and "treated [them] with increasing suspicion."
R. 233:79-80. Only one officer was "interested in" their story. R. 233:79. That officer
"took down" Sandoval's and Phillips' contact information. R. 233:79. But the officer in
charge "called . . . off the officers pursuing Sandoval and Phillips because he determined
that Porter and Creed, not Sandoval and Phillips, "were the suspects." R. 233:80. He
believed that Porter and Creed had "concocted this story . . . to rip off [their] parents." R.
233:80-81.
Detective Brent Adamson, "the lead investigator in this case," was not assigned to
the case until "about three days" after the incident. R. 233:172. He explained at trial that
officers "responded to" Phillips' house on the night of the incident, "but never actually
made it." R. 233:179. "To be perfectly honest, I'm not sure why they were canceled," he
said. R. 233:179. Officers called Phillips as soon as they received the information and
told Phillips to stay home. R. 233:180. Phillips complied. 11.233:180. It would have
been reasonable for officers to investigate Phillips and Sandoval as soon as they had an
identification. R. 233:182-83. But "for some reason," the officer in charge "determined
that they were not going to have the patrol deputies make contact with Mr. Phillips and
Mr. Sandoval. And that they would wait and have that done at a later time." R. 233:179.
This decision made no sense to Detective Adamson. R. 233:183-84. There may have
been evidence in the home that supported or undermined Creed's identification. R.
233:181. In particular, stolen items and/or clothes worn during the robbery might have
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been in the home. R. 233:181. Additionally, Sandoval, like Creed, may have scraped his
back or gotten dirt on his clothes if he was the person who wrestled Creed in the bushes.
R. 232:65, 97-98; 233:188-89; sec Slate's Exhibit 17.
Janet Kohlcr, Phillips' mother, testified that she went to her daughter's home on
the evening of November 4 to help with the children. R. 233:272. She left her apartment
at around 6:30 p.m. R. 233:271. When she left, Phillips, Sandoval, and Glen Johnson
were there. R. 233:271. At "around 10:00" p.m., she returned home because she
"received frantic phone calls from [hcr| son that the police were on their way over there."
R. 233:271-72. Phillips, Sandoval, and Johnson were still there when she returned. R.
233:272. Johnson was watching television in the living room. R. 233:272. Phillips "was
in his running shorts and socks playing the Playstation." R. 233:275, 279. She spoke to
officers outside and asked them to come in and search her home, but the officers never
came. 11.233:272,275,280.
The next day, Dennis Law, who returned from vacation early when he heard about
the burglary, found "some footprints" in the mud. R. 233:232. They were "the same
kind of footprints" as those "on the top of the TV." R. 233:232, 238. The prints were
"an average size footprint" and displayed "a disccrnablc pattern" with "squiggly lines
across it." R. 233:238-39. Dennis followed the footprints to the "neighbor's backyard,"
where he found two "duffel bags" that contained some of the stolen property. R.
232:116-18; 233:233-34. Dennis called the police and, while he waited, he walked down
the driveway, where he found ''a blue bandanna and a dark colored beanie type cap." R.
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233:235. In the parking area, he found more footprints "that looked similar to the other
footprints." R. 233:235, 238.
Eventually, Officer Jason Mudrock and Amy Johnson, a crime scene technician,
responded to the Law residence. R. 233:9, 160. Dennis showed them what he had found.
R. 233:10-11, 13, 17-18,21-22, 163-64. Officer Mudrock noted that the footprints had "a
mark," but was not sure whether the mark was enough to identify the print. R. 233:24.
Ms. Johnson estimated that the footprints were "between a | size] 7 I/2 and 8" and noted
that they had "impressions" from the soles of the shoes. R. 233:167, 170. She testified
that although the impressions "didn't have enough characteristics to make identification,"
it would have been helpful to compare the "suspect's shoes" to the shoe prints. R.
233:165, 167. Officer Mudrock and Ms. Johnson also located tire tracks "just to the side
of the gutter area." R. 233:16, 164-65; sec State's Exhibit 27. Officer Knudscn testified
at trial that it is possible to do a DNA test on a hair if it has "a full follicle." R. 233:153.
Officer Mudrock, however, testified that the hat and bandanna were not submitted for
DNA testing. R. 233:20-21. When defense counsel pulled a hair off the cap and asked if
it had a full follicle, Officer Knudscn said, "Don't even go there." R. 233:156.
Officers did not ask Creed to make an identification until about "two weeks" after
the incident. R. 232:62. At that time, Detective Adamson visited him at work and
produced two photo spreads. R. 232:62-63; 233:173; see State's Exhibits 18, 19. Creed
identified Sandoval's picture on one sheet, and Phillips' picture on the other. R. 232:6364. Later, Creed also picked Sandoval out of a line up. 11.232:65.
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Detective Adamson testified that other than the property in the two duffel bags, the
stolen property was not recovered. R. 233:175, 186. He noted, however, that during his
investigation, he learned that a man named "David Winfrey" used Dennis Law's stolen
"credit card . . . at a Tesoro gas station." R. 233:175-76. Additionally, "several of Mr.
Law's stolen checks were cashed . . . at the Army Navy Store in Taylorsville," and "at
several various different Wal-Marts in Idaho and Wyoming." R. 233:176. David
Winfrey "was arrested in Idaho on some check forgery cases in the same area where
some of Mr. Law's [stolen] checks ha[d] been cashed." R. 233:176. But Detective
Adamson did not "determine whether or not" Winfrey's arrest "was related to Mr. Law's
checks." R. 233:177. Detective Adamson testified that he "spoke to an investigator in
Idaho" and learned that Winfrey "had not provided any information, and was not
speaking to them." R. 233:187. He also asked the "detective who was working" the
Idaho case to "contact" him "if anything arose that may connect the two" cases. R.
233:188. Thereafter, he did not receive any information from the detective, so he
assumed that there was no evidence linking Winfrey to the burglary. R. 233:188.
Instead, Detective Adamson generalized that "with most stolen items, including checksf,]
credit cards and that, those are passed fairly rapidly amongst friends within . . . criminal
groups." R. 233:177.
D.

The Defense.
David testified that on November 3, he, Sandoval, and Phillips discussed returning

to the Law residence "the next night," but they made "no final plans." R. 233:226.
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Heidi, a witness for the State, testified that she spoke to Phillips on the telephone on
November 4 between 11:00 a.m. and 12:00 p.m. 11.233:41,48. She called Phillips at
home because he did not have a cell phone. R. 233:34. During their conversation,
Phillips mentioned that David had invited them to return to the Law residence that night.
11.233:30,41.
That evening, Phillips called Heidi between 7:00 and 7:30 p.m. R. 233:30, 42, 48.
He asked if she was planning to go to the Law residence. R. 233:30, 42. She said that
she was probably not going because she was probably going to spend the night at her
friends* cabin. R. 233:29-30, 41-42. When she arrived at the cabin, Heidi did not have
cell phone reception. R. 233:29. While she was at the cabin, Phillips left several voice
messages on her cell phone from his home telephone number. R. 233:49. In the
messages, Phillips again asked whether she planned to go to the Law residence that night.
R. 233:49. The telephone records showed that Phillips left the last message at 7:52 p.m.
R. 233:49-50.
Detective Adamson testified that he interviewed Heidi and Heidi told him that she
did not speak to Phillips on November 4. R. 233:174. Rather, Phillips left her a voice
message "sometime late in the evening." R. 233:174. In the message, Phillips said that
"he had been invited back to the Law residence on Saturday night" and asked if "she was
going" as well. R. 233:174-75. Additionally, without elaborating, David testified that
Heidi tells the truth most of the time, but "there ha|vc| been times in the past that the
truth was nor told. R. 233:217.
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Glen Johnson, a witness for the defense, also testified. He explained that he was a
father-figure to Phillips and had known Phillips since Phillips "was two months old." R.
233:243. lie also knew Sandoval because Sandoval had "been over several times." R.
233:243. Johnson testified that on the night of the burglary, he, Phillips, and Sandoval
were at Phillips' house. R. 233:245. He knew it was November 4 because they were
celebrating his birthday at the time. R. 233:245, 264. That night, he was "sitting on the
couch mostly watching TV." R, 233:246, 265. He drank "three beers" and fell asleep
"off and on." R. 233:255, 257. Phillips and Sandoval were in Phillips' room playing
video games. R. 233:246-47. They came out "to use the restroom and come into the
kitchen once in a while." R. 233:247. They also ate dinner together "around 7:00 or
8:00." R. 233:247-48. Johnson could not recall whether Phillips' mother returned to the
house that evening. R. 233:255. But he recalled that Phillips and Sandoval did not leave
that night. R. 233:248, 265, 273. They had no car to use because Phillips' mother had
her car with her "at her daughter's house." R. 233:248-49. He also testified that
Sandoval and Phillips did not use the telephone that night. R. 233:256, 266.
Detective Adamson testified that he interviewed Johnson on the telephone during
his investigation. R. 233:268. During the interview, "two things" occurred. R. 233:269.
"One, every time I asked him a specific question, . . . he gave me a very broad general
answer. He couldn't remember times. He couldift be very specific." R. 233:201, 269.
Detective Adamson "could also hear background noise, and he would hesitate before he
would answer questions." R. 233:201, 269. "It sounded as though someone else was
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talking in the background. I couldn't make what they were saying, but it sounded as if
another person was talking, possibly to Mr. Johnson." R. 233:201, 269. Johnson told
Detective Adamson "that he was at the residence on the Saturday evening over the course
of the weekend." R. 233:268. He said "that both Josh and Brandon had been at the
apartment all weekend." R. 233:268. Regarding a police interview within a month of the
burglary, Johnson recalled that he said Phillips and Sandoval "left for about half an hour
to use the phone." R. 233:249. He testified that statement was a mistake because he
"|g]ot days confused there for a minute." R. 233:249.
Sergeant Dick Waltrous testified that interviewed Johnson the day before trial. R.
233:263. During the interview, Johnson "had a strong odor of alcohol. His eyes were red
and glazed over. He exhibited slurred speech." R. 233:266. He said that "he was not
intoxicated." R. 233:266. He said that he got a black eye when he fell off his bike "on
his head." R. 233:266. Likewise, at trial, Johnson "smell[cd| like alcohol" and had a
black eye. R. 233:251-52, 267. He drank a pint of vodka Cw[l]ast night." R. 233:251, 274.
He said that he got the black eye when he fell off his bike. R. 233:253.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
This Court should reverse because the trial court improperly commented on the
evidence by giving Instruction 56 to the jury. It is the sole and exclusive province of the
jury to determine the facts of a criminal case and the trial judge is not permitted to
comment on the evidence. In this case, Instruction 56 commented on the evidence
because it unduly bolstered the eyewitness identification testimony. It also undermined
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whatever little protection the Long instruction normally gives by appearing to validate the
jurors' natural inclination to give eyewitness testimony great weight despite its deep and
generally unperceived flaws. Further, given the problematic features of the Creed's
identification and the weakness of State's case, this Court should reverse because there is
a reasonable likelihood that the jury would have acquitted absent the undue influence of
Instruction 56.
ARGUMENT
I.

THIS COURT SHOULD REVERSE BECAUSE THE TRIAL COURT
IMPROPERLY COMMENTED ON THE EVIDENCE BY GIVING
INSTRUCTION 56 TO THE JURY

"[A] trial court may not comment on the evidence or the credibility of a witness's
testimony/' State v. Taylor, 2005 UT 40, ^[22, 116 P.3d 360 (citing Utah R. Crim. P.
19(f) ("'The court shall not comment on the evidence in the case, and if the court refers to
any of the evidence, it shall instruct the jury that they are the exclusive judges of all
questions of fact/")); see also State v. Larson, 775 P.2d 415, 419 (Utah 1989) (holding
that a trial "court may not comment on the evidence or upon the credibility of a witness's
testimony"); State v. Adams, 583 P.2d 89, 91 (Utah 1978) (holding "that under our law
the court does not comment on the evidence nor upon the credibility of testimony; that is
left exclusively to the jury"); State v. Schoenfeld, 545 P.2d 193, 196 n. 8 (Utah 1976)
(holding that under Article I, Section 12 of the Utah Constitution, a defendant "is entitled
to a jury trial" meaning "the jurors are exclusive triers of fact and that the judge should
not comment on the evidence") (citations omitted)).
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'The reason for this rule is clear: 'It is the sole and exclusive province of the jury
to determine the facts in all criminal cases, whether the evidence offered by the State is
weak or strong, is in conflict or is not controverted.'" Taylor, 2005 UT 40 at 1J22
(quoting State v. Green. 78 Utah 580, 6 P.2d 177, 181 (Utah 1931)). In other words,
v4

| wjhen an accused enters a plea of not guilty, he has a right to have his entire case

submitted to the jury unless he waives such right by expressly admitting at the trial the
existence of some fact or facts which is or arc put in issue by the plea of not guilty."
Green, 6 P.2d at 181.
This Court should reverse because by giving Instruction 56 to the jury, the trial
court impermissibly commented on the evidence. See infra at Part A. Further, there is a
reasonable probability that the jury would have acquitted but for the trial court's error.
Sec infra at Part B.
A.

The Trial Court Erred By Giving Instruction 56 to the Jury Because It
Impermissibly Commented On the Evidence.
"|R|cgardlcss of the relative strength or weakness of the evidence in the case," it is

"the sole and exclusive province of the jury to determine the facts in a criminal case" and
"the trial judge is not permitted to comment on the evidence." State v. Roscnbaum, 22
Utah 2d 159, 449 P.2d 999, 1000 (Utah 1969). For example, in Green, the trial court
instructed the jury that the defendant shot the alleged victim, but allowed the jury to
decide whether the shooting was premeditated, as the State argued, or the result of
insanity, as the defendant argued. Green, 6 P.2d at 181. This Court determined the trial
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court erred by so instructing the jury because "[ijl is the sole and exclusive province of
the jury to determine the facts in all criminal cases, whether the evidence offered by the
state is weak or strong, is in conflict or is not controverted." Id.
Similarly, in Rosenbaum, the trial court instructed the jury, "Due to the very
nature of the defense of alibi, in that it is easily fabricated and difficult to disprove, you
should consider it with caution." Rosenbaum, 449 P.2d at 1000. This Court again
reversed because the instruction "commentfed] on the evidence" by indicating to the jury
"that evidence is cither weak or convincing." Id.; see also State v. Mannion, 19 Utah
505, 57 P. 542 (Utah 1899) (holding trial court erred by instructing defendant "to take a
seat" elsewhere when alleged victim testified, "I am afraid to tell, because I am afraid of
[defendant]," because the jury could "draw the inference that the court not only believed
her statement, but believed the witness had good reasons for making the statement");
Brown v. State, 678 So. 2d 910, 911-12 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (holding trial court
erred by commenting "in open court during final argument that there is no evidence that
either witness had lied" because it "amounted to the trial judge's assessment of the very
issue reposed in the jury"); Price v. State, 347 S.W.2d 616, 617 (Tex. Crim. App. 1961)
(holding trial court erred by saying witness was "an authority on the subject" because
"his comment vouched for the credibility of the witness 11 and bolstered his testimony").
In this case, the trial court erred by giving Instruction 56 to the jury because it
impermissibly commented on the evidence. Instruction 56 said, "A conviction can be
based on the uncorroborated testimony of a single eyewitness." R. 163. The State
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drafted instruction 56 based on language in State v. Spencer, 497 P.2d 636 (Utah 1972).
In Spencer, our supreme court rejected the defendant's argument that it should "adopt a
rule to the effect that where the identification of a defendant is established by the
testimony of one witness alone corroboration should be required to connect the defendant
with the offense." Spencer, 497 P.2d at 637. In rejecting this argument, our supreme
court did not comment on the trustworthiness of eyewitness identifications or the
propriety of resting a conviction solely on an eyewitness identification. See Spencer, 497
P.2d at 637, To the contrary, it simply held that a rule requiring corroboration is the
province of "the legislature" and it is not "advisable" for the court to make such a rule
through "court decision or rule." Spencer, 497 P.2d at 637.
Because the Legislature has not issued legislation requiring corroboration in
eyewitness identification cases, Utah law today still allows a conviction to rest solely on
an eyewitness identification. See, e.g., State v. Mills, 530 P.2d 1272, 1273 (Utah 1975)
(citing Spencer for proposition that child's eyewitness "identification was sufficient to
connect defendant with the offense").
This does not mean, however, that it was appropriate to give Instruction 56 to the
jury. Instruction 56 is objectionable not because it stated the law, but because it focused
its statement of the law on one particular witness. See Schocnfeld, 545 P.2d at 196-97
(determining that instructions did not impermissibly comment on the evidence because
they "are stated in abstract generality; and they do not purport to tell the jury either what
the evidence is or what the facts are").
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In Instruction 12, the trial court properly stated the law in "abstract generality."
Schocnfeld, 545 P.2d at 196-97; sec R. 129. Instruction 12 informs the jury that it is
"entitled to believe one witness as against many or many as against one, in accordance
with fits] honest convictions." R. 129; see State v. Shabata, 678 P.2d 785, 791 (Utah
1984) (holding, to determine credibility, finders of fact may "consider all of the facts
affirmatively shown, as well as any unexplained areas, and draw whatever inferences
may fairly and reasonably be drawn therefrom in the light of their own experience and
judgment" (quotations and citation omitted)); State v. Kent, 20 Utah 2d 1, 432 P.2d 64,
72 n. 6 (Utah 1967) (holding juror is permitted to '"scrutinize^ the witnesses,"' '"notef]
their demeanor and behavior on the witness stand,"' and place "'his reliance on those
whom he believes to be telling the truth'" (citation omitted) (emphasis in original)).
Instruction 56 duplicates the statement of the law provided in Instruction 12.
Compare R. 163 with R. 129. Its statement of the law. however, impermissibly
comments on the evidence by unduly focusing the jury's attention on one witness's
testimony. See R. 129. By singling out one witness's testimony for special mention,
Instruction 56 impermissibly bolsters that witness's testimony. Sec R. 129. This undue
emphasis would be inappropriate in any case, but it was particularly inappropriate here
because the witness discussed in Instruction 56 was the eyewitness. Sec R. 129.
Eyewitness testimony is uniquely difficult for juries to judge. See State v.
Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 779-80 (Utah 1991). In Ramirez, our supreme court reviewed
"scientific literature and concluded that it 'is replete with empirical studies documenting
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the unreliability of eyewitness identification/" Id. at 779 (quoting State v. Long, 721
P.2d 483, 488 (Utah 1986)). Jurors, however, vCCare, for the most part, unaware of these
problems.'" Id. "'People simply do not accurately understand the deleterious effects that
certain variables can have on the accuracy of the memory processes of an honest
eyewitness/" IdL "Moreover, the common knowledge that people do possess often runs
contrary to documented research findings." Long, 721 P.2d at 488 (citing Llizabeth F.
Loftus, Eyewitness Testimony, 171-77 (1 st cd. 1979)). "Perhaps it is precisely because
jurors do not appreciate the fallibility of eyewitness testimony that they give such
testimony great weight." Id, at 490; see, e.g., R. N. Ilabcr & L. Ilaber, Experiencing,
Remembering and Reporting Events, 6 Psychol. Pub. Pol. & L. 1057, 1059 (2000)
("Jurors report that they find it very difficult to consider any alternatives to a confident
statement by an eyewitness."); D. P. Judges, Two Cheers for the Department of Justice's
Eyewitness Evidence: A Guide for Law Enforcement, 53 Ark. L. Rev. 231, 264 (2000)
(noting that "a confident witness tends to make participant-jurors ignore the witnessing
conditions themselves and believe the eyewitness at a rate that exceeds the actual rate of
accuracy" (citation omitted)); J. Brigham, A. Wasserman & C. Mcissner, Disputed
Eyewitness Identification Evidence: Important Legal and Scientific Issues, 36 Ct. Rev. 1,
12 (1999) (''Eyewitness testimony, when delivered in a confident manner by a witness,
may be more convincing to jurors than any other type of evidence.").
To combat "the great weight jurors are likely to give eyewitness testimony, and
the deep and generally unperccived flaws in it," our supreme court requires a cautionary
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instruction to be given "whenever eyewitness identification is a central issue in a case and
such an instruction is requested by the defense." Long, 721 P.2d at 492. This cautionary
instruction "sensitizes | the jury to the factors that empirical research have shown to be of
importance in determining the accuracy of eyewitness identifications, especially those
that laypersons most likely would not appreciate." Id. at 492; see R. 164-66.
The cautionary instruction, however, "is not a panacea." Long, 721 P.2d at 492 n.
5. In Long, our supreme court recognized that the "only study evaluating" a cautionary
instruction at the time "indicated that the . . . instruction had little effect on jurors'
sensitivity to the factors affecting the reliability of eyewitness identification." Id.
Studies issued since then affirm that cautionary instructions, even when combined with
cross-examination and closing arguments, have little effect on jurors' sensitivity to the
problems with eyewitness identification. See, e.g., Judges, 53 Ark. L. Rev. at 234
(suggesting "error-avoidance and -correction mechanisms usually relied on by the law—
prosecutorial discretion, cross-examination by counsel, evidentiary rulings by judges,
jury decision-making, and appellate review—arc less than adequate to remedy the
problem" of eyewitness testimony); M. R. Lieppe, The Case for Expert Testimony About
Eyewitness Memory, 1 Psychol. Pub. Pol. & L. 909, 923 (1995) (explaining that "|T]or a
number of reasons, including data from empirical studies, cross-examination, opening
and closing arguments, and judge's instructions cannot be relied on to counter mistaken
eyewitness identification"); G. L. Wells, ct al., Eyewitness Identification Procedures:
Recommendations for Lineups and Photospreads, 22 Law & Hum. Behav. 603, 609
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(1998) (noting cross-examination "is largely useless for detecting witnesses who are
trying to be truthful but are genuinely mistaken").
Given the minimal protection offered by the Long instruction against the dangers
of misidentification, Instruction 56 was particularly inappropriate. By highlighting
Creed's eyewitness testimony and identifying it specifically as testimony capable of
convicting Sandoval without any corroboration, Instruction 56 unduly bolstered Creed's
eyewitness testimony. See R. 129. Additionally, it undermined whatever little protection
the Long instruction normally gives by seeming to validate the jurors' natural inclination
to give eyewitness testimony "great weight" despite its "deep and generally unperceived
flaws." Long, 721 P.2d at 492 & n.5.
Thus, by instructing the jury that "[a] conviction can be based on the
uncorroborated testimony of a single eyewitness," R. 163, the trial court erroneously
commented on the evidence because it unduly emphasized and bolstered the State's
eyewitness testimony.
B.

The Trial Court's Error Prejudiced Sandoval's Case.
"In order to constitute reversible error, the error complained of must be

sufficiently prejudicial that there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable result for
the defendant in its absence." Seel v. Van Per Vcur, 971 P.2d 924, 926 (Utah 1998)
(citation omitted). For example, in Brown, the appellate court determined the trial court's
comment, "There is no evidence that anybody is a liar," was prejudicial because the
State's "case was founded entirely on the credibility of the two witnesses, there being no
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tangible or objective evidence of the crimes charged, or other witnesses." State v.
Brown, 678 So. 2d 910, 911 (Ha. Dist. Ct. App. 1996). Similarly, in Price, the appellate
court decided the trial court's comment about a witness, "Well, he is an authority on the
subject," was prejudicial because the witness was testifying "upon a material issue in the
case." Price, 347 S.W.2d at 617.
When reviewing a case for prejudice, '"jury instructions must be viewed as a
whole rather than in isolated segments/" Taylor, 2005 UT 40 at ^|24 (citation omitted).
Thus, in Taylor, our supreme court held that the challenged instruction did not prejudice
the defendant by "suggesting to the jury that it was not allowed to question the victim's . .
. credibility" because another instruction "specifically articulated the jury's obligation to
consider the credibility of the witnesses and weigh the evidence." IcL atffi]21,24; see
also Larson, 775 P.2d at 419-20 (holding trial court's statement was not "a comment on
the weight of the evidence" and, besides, "the court specifically instructed the jury to
disregard any expression by the court that seemed to indicate the court's opinion about
any of the evidence and cautioned it to be the 'sole and only judges of the facts'").
In this case, the trial court's instruction was prejudicial. Instruction 56 unduly
emphasized and bolstered Creed Law's eyewitness testimony. Sec supra at Part A. This
prejudiced Sandoval because Creed's testimony was the only direct evidence that linked
Sandoval to the burglary. R. 232-34. Moreover, the State's case, including Creed's
testimony, was so weak that there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury would not have
convicted but for the undue influence of Instruction 56.
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First, absent the undue influence of Instruction 56, there is a reasonable likelihood
that the jury would have disbelieved Creed's eyewitness identification because it exhibits
many features that diminish its accuracy. Creed's opportunity to observe the burglars
was brief and hindered by the conditions of the evening. R. 164-66: see Long, 721 P.2d
at 493-94 (stating that "capacity to observe" is an "area[J of concern" and is affected by
"such matters as how long or short a time was available, how far or close the witness
was, how good were lighting conditions, whether the witness had had occasion to see or
know the person in the past"). It was "completely dark" outside. R. 233:119, 134. Even
if there was a full moon, R. 232:97, and even if the lights on the house were on, R.
232:61-62. 127, there would have been shadows that distorted and masked the burglars'
features. Both people were wearing "hoodies" and at least one person had the hood on.
R. 232:72-73, 121. And the entire incident "happened very, very rapidly." R. 232:73-74.
Further, Creed's identification may have been influenced by personal bias or
prejudice. R. 164-66; sec Long, 721 P.2d at 489 (explaining that "personal experiences,
biases, and prejudices" "affect the accuracy of a viewer's perception"). Creed had only
met Sandoval and Phillips once before. R. 232:43. During that meeting, he developed a
"prejudice" toward them. R. 232:77, 91. He distrusted them immediately, believed they
were gangsters, thought they were giving him the evil eye, and refused to ask them to
leave because he feared they would retaliate. R. 232:68-72, 77-80, 91.
Additionally. Creed's identification may have been influenced by stress or fright at
the time of observation. R. 164-66: sec Long, 721 P.2d at 489 ("Contrary to much
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accepted lore, when an observer is experiencing a marked degree of stress, perceptual
abilities arc known to decrease significantly." (citation omitted)). When Creed rounded
the corner, he was confronted by two strangers. R. 232:37. One was "crouched down"
like "a line backer." R. 232:39-40, 99-100. The situation was so disturbing, in fact, that
Creed immediately "tackled" the first person. R. 232:40, 97, 101. Moments later, he
"hear[dj a pop*" and believed he had been "shot at." R. 232:41-42, 107-10. When this
happened, Creed went into "shock." R. 232:109. He was so frightened that he played
"dead" and did not even dare to call 911 "for quite a little while." R. 232:42, 109-10.
Finally, Creed's identification is questionable because he changed his testimony
during trial. See Long, 721 P.2d at 493 (listing consistency as a "commonly accepted
arca[| of concern"). On direct examination, Creed testified that he did not identify the
people as Sandoval and Phillips until after he wrestled the first person into the bushes and
got him in a hcadlock. R. 232:40-41, 97. To the contrary, on cross-examination, Creed
testified that he "recognized" Sandoval as he "was running towards him." R. 232:97. lie
also testified that he recognized Sandoval and Phillips "|ajs soon as |hc] saw them." R.
232:139.
Second, absent the undue influence of Instruction 56, there is a reasonable
likelihood that the jury would have disbelieved the State's case because the story told by
Creed and Porter is suspicious. For example, according to Creed, the burglars committed
the crime with w'[c]vcry light pretty much in the house" on. R. 232:61-62, 127. This is
suspicious because, contrasted against the "completely dark" sky, R. 233:119, the
33

burglars would have known that they were as visible as "fish in a fish bo[wlJ." R.
233:75. For another example, Porter said that he was in the house during the burglary.
R. 232:131; 233:65, 108. He heard "some banging" as the burglars ripped everything out
of the master bedroom and front closets and as they jumped "up and down on [the] TV"
in the master bedroom so violently that they tore it from the wall and broke a spindle off
the banister. R. 232:131; 233:65, 67, 232. Despite this destructive noise, he testified that
he was not suspicious and did not investigate. R. 233:65-67, 108. In fact, Creed and
Porter's story was so suspicious that the officers called to the scene suspected they had
"concocted this story" themselves "to rip off [their) parents." R. 233:80-81.
Third, absent the undue influence of Instruction 56, there is a reasonable
likelihood that the jury would have disbelieved the State's case because the evidence
showed that it would have been difficult for Sandoval and Phillips to commit the
burglary. The Law residence was difficult to find. R. 233:36. Assuming the driver knew
the way, it took ten to fifteen minutes to drive from Phillips' home to the Law residence
at 3:00 a.m., when traffic is very light. R. 233:216. And the burglary was apparently
committed by someone with a vehicle. R. 233:16, 164-65; sec State's Ex. 27. But
Sandoval and Phillips had only gone to the Law residence once, in the dark, and they did
not drive. R. 233:32, 209. Further, neither Sandoval nor Phillips had access to a car. R.
233:32, 209, 248-49. Plus, Phillips called Heidi from his home at 7:52 p.m. R. 233:4950. This left very little time for Sandoval and Phillips to complete the burglary before
9:00 p.m., particularly since they did not have a car and traffic would have been heavier
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than it was at 3:00 a.m. R. 233:32, 209, 248-49. Additionally, Glen Johnson, while not
the most reliable witness, testified that Sandoval and Phillips did not leave the house on
the night of the burglary. R. 233:248, 265, 273.
Fourth, absent the undue influence of Instruction 56, there is a reasonable
likelihood that the jury would have disbelieved the State's case because the State, despite
having several opportunities to corroborate Creed's identification during its investigation,
elected not to. For example, officers had the opportunity to interview both Sandoval and
Phillips shortly after the burglary. R. 233:180. They also had permission to search
Phillips' home, where both boys had spent the evening. R. 233:272, 275, 280. Searching
the house and/or interviewing Sandoval and Phillips could have produced evidence that
supported or undermined Creed's identification, including stolen items, clothes worn
during the robbery, and scratches sustained by wrestling in the bushes. R. 232:65, 97-98;
233:181, 188-89; see State's Exhibit 17. The State did not take advantage of this
opportunity, however. R. 233:80. Instead, the officer in charge "called . . . off the
officers going to Phillips' house and decided that they would pursue that lead "at a later
time." 11.233:80, 179.
For another example, David Winfrey, a person unconnected to Phillips or
Sandoval by any evidence, was caught using Dennis Law's stolen credit card and was
arrested for check forgery "in the same area [of Idaho] where some of Mr. Law's [stolen]
checks ha[d] been cashed." R. 233:175-76. But the State made little effort to follow up
on this lead. R. 233:188. Instead, it relied on Detective Adamson's generalization at trial
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that "most stolen items, including checks) J credit cards and that, . . . arc passed fairly
rapidly amongst friends within . . . criminal groups." R. 233:177.
Additionally, the State failed to fully investigate the physical evidence available to
it. The crime scene technician lifted a fingerprint from the broken spindle on the
banister. R. 233:142. This fingerprint did not belong to Mr. or Mrs. Law so it is "a good
assumption" that it belonged to the burglar who broke the spindle. R. 233:149. But the
fingerprint did not belong to Phillips or Sandoval and the crime scene technician did not
test the fingerprint against Creed or Porter. R. 233:143, 150. Next, there were footprints
on the television and in the yard. R. 233:232, 238, The footprints were "between a [size]
7 V2 and 8" and had "a discernable pattern." R. 233:167, 170, 238-39. The crime scene
technician testified that it would have been helpful to compare Sandoval's and/or
Phillips' shoes to the prints, but this was never done. R. 233:165, 167. Last, the beanie
cap and bandanna could have produced DNA evidence if any of the hairs on them
contained "a full follicle." R. 233:153. But the State never submitted the items for DNA
testing. R. 233:20-21. When asked at trial if a particular hair from the items had a full
follicle. Officer Knudscn said, "Don't even go there." R. 233:156.
Intensifying the prejudicial effect of Instruction 56, the State relied heavily on the
instruction in its closing argument. During closing argument, the State admitted that its
investigation was "less than perfect." R. 234:45. But it argued that the jury should
convict the defendants anyway because Creed's identification was a "good solid
identification." R. 234:47. The State also repeatedly referenced Instruction 56 and said
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that it was "the law." R. 234:48. Apparently comingling the ideas that Creed's
identification was "solid" and that Instruction 56 was "the law," the State argued that
there was an "ID here, you can't dispute that. There is ID. There is a law [] telling you
there is, that's good testimony." R. 234:48.
The record shows that the jury did not find Creed's testimony particularly credible
or the State's case particularly compelling. On the first day of deliberation, the jury
deliberated for more than five hours and asked two questions. R. 234-35. These
questions dealt specifically with the credibility of Creed's identification: "Where are the
outside lights in the yard where the fight was located?" and "Do we have to consider any
of the | Long 1 factors for which there is no evidence?" R. 234:58-59, 61. On the second
day of deliberation, the jury asked two more questions. R. 118; 168-69; 235:6. These
questions dealt with reasonable doubt: "Can lack of evidence be considered when
substantiating doubt?" and "If there is doubt arc wc or are we not required to give the
defendants the benefit of the doubt?" Sec n. 1. Further, the trial court gave the jury a
verdict-urging instruction. R. 118; 235:4-5. Even with this additional instruction, the
jury deliberated for more than three additional hours. R. 167; 234:3-4.
Had the trial court not unduly bolstered Creed's testimony by giving Instruct 56,
see supra at Part A, there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury would have discredited it
and found Sandoval not guilty. Accordingly, this Court should reverse because the trial
court abused its discretion by giving Instruction 56 to the jury and the trial court's error
prejudiced Sandoval.
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CONCLUSION
This Court should reverse and remand for a new trial because the trial court
impermissibly commented on the evidence when it gave Instruction 56 to the jury.
SUBMITTHD this _ 9 _ day of February, 2009.

LORIJ.SIiPPI
'
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT

vs.

Case No: 061907636 FS

BRANDON LEE SANDOVAL,
Defendant,

Judge:
Date:

RANDALL SKANCHY
Auril 17, 2008

PRESENT
Clerk:
saram
Prosecutor: COLLINS, CHOU CHOU
Defendant
Defendant's Attorney(s): WEST, JOHN K
DEFENDANT INFORMATION
Date of birth: January 29, 1983
Video
Tape Number;
12:10
CHARGES
1. AGGRAVATED BURGLARY - 1st Degree Felony
Plea-. Guilty - Disposition: 02/19/2008 Guilty
2. THEFT - 2nd Degree Felony
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 02/19/2008 Guilty
3. CRIMINAL MISCHIEF - 3rd Degree Felony
Plea; Guilty - Disposition: 02/19/2008 Guilty
SENTENCE PRISON
Based on the defendant's conviction of AGGRAVATED BURGLARY a let
Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term
of not less than five years and which may be life in the Utah State
Prison.
The prison term is suspended.
Based on the defendant's conviction of THEFT a 2nd Degree Felony,
the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term of nob less
than one year nor more than fifteen years in the Utah State Prison.
The prison term is suspended.

Case No: 061907636
Date:
Apr 17, 2008

Based on the defendant's conviction of CRIMINAL MISCHIEF a 3rd
Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term
of not to exceed five years in the Utah State Prison.
The prison term is suspended.
SENTENCE PRISON CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE
The counts are to run concurrent and are suspended.

SENTENCE JAIL

Based on the defendant's conviction of CRIMINAL MISCHIEF a 3rd
Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to a term of 365 day(s)
Credit is granted
Credit is granted
Restitution
Pay in behalf of:

for time served.
for 145 day{s) previously served.
Amount: $8154.08 Plus Interest
FARMERS INSURANCE

Restitution
Amount: $14882.56
Pay in behalf of: DENNIS LAW
Attorney Fees
Amount: $400.00
Pay in behalf of: SALT LAKE COUNTY
ORDER OF PROBATION
The defendant is placed on probation for 3 6 month(s).
Probation is to be supervised by Adult Probation & Parole,
Defendant to serve 365 day(s) jail.

Case No: 061907636
Date:
Apr 17, 2008

PROBATION CONDITIONS
Usual and ordinary conditions required by the Department of Adult
Probation & Parole.
Submit to searches of person and property upon the request of any
Law Enforcement Officer.
Do not use, consume or possess alcohol or illegal drugs, nor
associate with any people using, possessing or consuming alcohol or
illegal drugs.
Violate no laws.
Not frequent any place where drugs are used, sold, or otherwise
distributed illegally.
Defendant is to be have no contact with Mr Phillips and the victims
in this case.
Defendant is to successfully complete a substance abuse evaluation
and any recommedned treatment.
Defendant is to successfully complete a victim empathy class*
Electronic monitoring if requested by AP&P,
Dated this 1 7 day of
/\p^uP

RANDALL
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U.S. Const. Amend. XIV
Section 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the state wherein they reside.
No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities
of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws.

Section 2. Representatives shall be apportioned among the several states according
to their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each state,
excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote at any election for the choice of
electors for President and Vice President of the United States, Representatives in
Congress, the executive and judicial officers of a state, or the members of the legislature
thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabitants of such state, being twenty-one years of
age, and citizens of the United States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in
rebellion, or other crime, the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the
proportion which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of
male citizens twenty-one years of age in such state.

Section 3. No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or elector
of President and Vice President, or hold any office, civil or military, under the United
States, or under any state, who, having previously taken an oath, as a member of
l

Congress, or as an officer of the United States, or as a member of any state legislature, or
as an executive or judicial officer of any state, to support the Constitution of the United
States, shall have engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the same, or given aid or
comfort to the enemies thereof. But Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each House,
remove such disability.

Section 4. The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by law,
including debts incurred for payment of pensions and bounties for services in suppressing
insurrection or rebellion, shall not be questioned. But neither the United States nor any
state shall assume or pay any debt or obligation incurred in aid of insurrection or
rebellion against the United States, or any claim for the loss or emancipation of any slave;
but all such debts, obligations and claims shall be held illegal and void.

Section 5. The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation,
the provisions of this article.

2

Utah Const. Art. 1, § 7
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of
law.

UTAHR. CRIM. P. 19
(a) After the jury is sworn and before opening statements, the court may instruct
the jury concerning the jurors' duties and conduct, the order of proceedings, the elements
and burden of proof for the alleged crime, and the definition of terms. The court may
instruct the jury concerning any matter stipulated to by the parties and agreed to by the
court and any matter the court in its discretion believes will assist the jurors in
comprehending the case. Preliminary instructions shall be in writing and a copy provided
to each juror. At the final pretrial conference or at such other time as the court directs, a
party may file a written request that the court instruct the jury on the law as set forth in
the request. The court shall inform the parties of its action upon a requested instruction
prior to instructing the jury, and it shall furnish the parties with a copy of its proposed
instructions, unless the parties waive this requirement.
(b) During the course of the trial, the court may instruct the jury on the law if the
instruction will assist the jurors in comprehending the case. Prior to giving the written
instruction, the court shall advise the parties of its intent to do so and of the content of the
instruction. A party may request an interim written instruction.
(c) At the close of the evidence or at such earlier time as the court reasonably
directs, any party may file written request that the court instruct the jury on the law as set
forth in the request. At the same time copies of such requests shall be furnished to the
other parties. The court shall inform counsel of its proposed action upon the request; and
it shall furnish counsel with a copy of its proposed instructions, unless the parties waive
1

this requirement. Final instructions shall be in writing and at least one copy provided to
the jury. The court shall provide a copy to any juror who requests one and may, in its
discretion, provide a copy to all jurors.
(d) Upon each written request so presented and given, or refused, the court shall
endorse its decision and shall initial or sign it. If part be given and part refused, the court
shall distinguish, showing by the endorsement what part of the charge was given and
what part was refused.
(e) Objections to written instructions shall be made before the instructions are
given to the jury. Objections to oral instructions may be made after they are given to the
jury, but before the jury retires to consider its verdict. The court shall provide an
opportunity to make objections outside the hearing of the jury. Unless a party objects to
an instruction or the failure to give an instruction, the instruction may not be assigned as
error except to avoid a manifest injustice. In stating the objection the party shall identify
the matter to which the objection is made and the ground of the objection.
(f) The court shall not comment on the evidence in the case, and if the court refers
to any of the evidence, it shall instruct the jury that they are the exclusive judges of all
questions of fact.
(e) Arguments of the respective parties shall be made after the court has given the
jury its final instructions. Unless otherwise provided by law, any limitation upon time for
argument shall be within the discretion of the court.

2
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Use your common sense as a reasonable person in making these decisions.
Review all the evidence. Don't imagine things which have no evidence to back them
up. Consider the evidence fairly without any bias or sympathy toward either side.
12.

DECIDING WHETHER TO BELIEVE A WITNESS

As each witness testifies, you must decide how accurate that testimony is. It may
help you to ask yourself questions such as these:
Personal Interest. Does the witness have a personal interest in how the trial
comes out?
Other Bias. Does the witness have some other bias or motive to testify a certain
way?
Demeanor: What impression is made by the witness's appearance and conduct
while answering questions?
Consistency. Did the witness make conflicting statements or contradict other
evidence?
Knowledge and Memory. Did the witness have a good opportunity to know the
facts and the ability to remember them?
Reasonableness. Is the testimony reasonable in light of human experience?
You're not required to believe all that a witness says. You are entitled to believe
one witness as against many or many as against one, in accordance with your honest
convictions.
13,

WHAT IF A WITNESS PURPOSELY GIVES FALSE TESTIMONY?

If you believe a witness has purposely given false testimony about anything
relevant to the case, you may disregard not only the false testimony but the remaining

jurcnmins 6/15/00
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INSTRUCTION NO. fT&
A conviction can be based on the uncorroborated testimony of a single eyewitness.

INSTRUCTION NO.

S7

An important question in this case is the identification of the defendant as the person who
committed the crime. The prosecution has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt, not
only that the crime was committed, but also that the defendant was the person who committed
the crime. If, after considering the evidence you have heard from both sides, you are not
convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is the person who committed the crime,
you must find the defendant not guilty.
The identification testimony that you have heard was an expression of belief or
impression by the witness. To find the defendant not guilty, you need not believe that the
identification witness was not insincere, but merely that the witness was mistaken in his or her
belief or impression.
Many factors affect the accuracy of identification.

In considering whether the

prosecution has proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is the person who
committed the crime, you should consider the following:
1.

Did the witness have an adequate opportunity to observe the criminal actor? In

answering this question, you should consider:
(a)

the length of time the witness observed the actor;

(b)

the distance between the witness and the actor;

(c)

the light or lack of light at the place and time of observation

(d)

the presence or absence of distracting noises or activity during the
observation;

(e)

any other circumstance affecting the opportunity of the witness to observe
the person committing the crime.

2.

Did the witness have the capacity to observe the person committing the crime? In

answering this question, you should consider whether the capacity of the witness was impaired
by:

3.

(a)

stress or fright at the time of observation;

(b)

personal motivations, biases or prejudices;

(c)

fatigue or injury.

Whether the witness is of a different race than the criminal actor. Identification

by a person of a different race may be less reliable than identification by a person of the same
race.
4.

Was the identification of the defendant by the witness completely the product of

the witness' own memory? In answering this question, you should consider:
(a)

the length of time that passed between the original observation of the
witness and the identification of the defendant by the witness;

(b)

the mental capacity and state of mind of the witness at the time of the
identification:

(c)

the exposure of the witness to opinions, to photographs, or to any other
information or influence that may have affected the independence of the
identification of the defendant by the witness;

(d)

any instance when the witness failed to identify the defendant;

(e)

any instances when the witness gave a description of the actor that is
inconsistent with the defendant's appearance;

(f)

the circumstances under which the defendant was presented to the witness
for identification.

You may take into account that an identification made by picking the defendant from a
group of similar individuals is generally more reliable that an identification made from the
defendant being presented alone to the witness.
You may also take into account that identifications made from seeing the person are
generally more reliable that identifications made from a photograph.
If, after considering the evidence you have heard from the prosecution and from the
defense, and after evaluating the eyewitness testimony in light of the considerations listed above,
you are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is the person who committed the
crime charged, and you find all of the other elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt,
you must find the defendant guilty of the crime charged.
If, on the other hand, you are not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant
was the person who committed the crime charged you must find the defendant not guilty of the
crime charged
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THE COURT:

Number 7 and 8 in your packets and they

are entitled to number two and number 1 at least in the —
MR. WEST:

Just the copies.

I didn't put any marks

on the original.
THE COURT:
MR. WEST:

Right.

Right.

They have been withdrawn.

Thank you.

And the other issue I have, Your Honor, is the
Statef s one-line instruction that says: A conviction could be
based on the uncorroborated testimony of a single eyewitness.
I don't dispute that fact that that's the case under
the law.

But I don't think that it is necessarily appropriate

to instruct the jury to that fact.

The jury should have

instructions with regards to assessing the credibility of
eyewitnesses and that —

and so on.

I don't think that —

I think that this instruction is —
undue emphasis on —

probably puts

it suggests to the jury that the Court has

sufficient belief in Creed Law.
THE COURT:

It iitmediately proceeds the —

it doesn't

immediately proceed it, but we have a final instruction, an
instruction associated with eyewitness identification.
MR. WEST:
THE COURT:

Uh-hitm.
It's not duplicative, or is it?

Do you

consider it to be duplicative?
MR. WEST:
Court —

Well, it would be duplicative if the

a typical stock instruction is one that tells the

.TawsTT
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MR.
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1

juryv among other things, that they can believe the testimony

2

of one witness over many or —

3

THE COURT: We have that.

4

MR. WEST:

5

THE COURT:

6

And I didn't see that in this packet.
It's in the preliminary instructions.

It's 14 or 15.

7

MR. WEST:

I believe it duplicates that instruction

8

and probably puts undue emphasis on Mr. Law's testimony and may

9

cause the jury to give undue weight to his testimony.

10

THE COURT:

11

particular issue, so go ahead.

12

You've submitted case law on this

MS. COLLINS: Your Honor, the case law supports this

13

instruction; and the case law has never been modified or

14

overruled.

15

It is still a good case.

MR. WEST: Well, the case law doesn't support

16

offering that instruction.

17

happened was the defense asked for an instruction —

18

recall correctly that —

19

instruction was offered in that case. Rather the defense

20

appealed on the grounds that there was only one eyewitness and

21

that was found not to be a valid basis for appeal. But it is

22

not a valid basis for offering that instruction.

23 I

MS. CX)LLINS:

In that particular case what
if I

I mean, I don't think that this

I agree that the instruction was not

24 | offered or was not stated in the case that was offered.
25 I I'm not sure if that was offered or not.

So,

But I do believe the

1

case supports that instruction.

2
3

Because that's the basis.

That's the essence of the

case.

4

MR. GARCIA:

Your Honor, again, in this case, this is

5

an identification case and that other case may or may not have

6

been.

7

one witness against many witnesses and things like that. We're

8

instructing them about the —

9

this.

10

And. the point is, we are already instructing them about

again that instruction covers

And I agree that this seems to emphasize the State's

11

theory and could give the jury the impression that perhaps that

12

the Court is —

13

might be allowed to speculate as to why that is there separate

14

and on its own on one piece of paper, when they already have

15

instructions that cover that.

16

State's theory unfairly.

17
18

again, I know that this is —

doesn't seem to be in the packet.
THE COURT:

20

MR. WEST:

21

THE COURT:

23

It just seems to emphasis the

And I also have a lesser included offense, but it

19

22

again, the jury

So, I didn't —

I just took one.
I withdraw it as well.
You have the final word on this

Ms. Collins.
MS. COLLINS:

I don't have anything else to say.

24

think it's supported by the case. And I think it does not

25

create any kind of misleading information because that is

I

1

exactly what that case is all about.

2

is entitled to give that instruction or request the Court to

3

give that instruction to the jury.

4

And I believe the State

And this is an identification case. We do have a

5

long instruction there and with that balance, we have all the

6

necessary instructions in the packet.

7
8
9
10

THE COURT:

I'll take a look at it and see and

compare to where we are.
MR. WEST:
THE COURT:

I'll let you know tomorrow morning.

Thank you, Your Honor.
I have to say I'm inclined to keep it out

11

because we have an instruction that goes to the one witnesses

12

against many or many against one.

13

And then we have our standard stock which is usually

14

provided associated with the identification instruction.

15

I'll give it some thought over the course of the evening and

16

let you know tomorrow morning.

17

All right.

18

tomorrow at 9:00.

19

about 9:10 or so.

20

Well, why don't we plan on starting

They'll be here.

But we'll probably start

We had some difficulties with jurors getting in this

21

morning but that is probably due to the weather.

22

are anxious to get on the road.

23

be, would like to be, in St. George tomorrow.

24
25

But

I know they

One of them, I think, has to

Let's anticipate that we'll have the jury up here and
seated in that box by 9:10 or so.
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MR. WEST:

I object as well.

I don't think itfs

appropriate.

3

THE COURT:

I don't think we are going to allow that,

4

Ms. Collins.

5

and you rested last night.

6

opportunity to reopen or recall a rebuttal witness.

7

I understand it was your witness to begin with,
So, I won't give you the

Now, on jury instructions I have included an

8

instruction on the one that was provided by the State

9

associated with the case law in the Sate of Utah versus

10

Spencer.

11

I did so, and let me explain my reasoning.
I understand there's an objection, and you have your

12

objection on the record.

13

this Court has given its explanation.

14

law, and appears to be good law in the State of Utah.

15

addition, in view of the length and nature of the

16

identification —

17

jury should go through in terms of calculating how to treat

18

identification witnesses, it seems proper in the context of

19

those other two instructions which we have.

20
21
22
23

It is siipported by case
In

identification of witness deliberations the

And so that —
instructions.

But you can make it as well after

I don't have a copy of the jury

Do you have —

THE CLERK:

They are out on the counter, Your Honor.

Let me grab them.

24 I

THE COURT:

Counsel doesn't have them yet?

25 I

MR. WEST: We have them.

1

MS. COLLINS:

Yes, I do.

2

THE COURT:

3

Anyway, counsel, you have got the benefit of the

Just me.

4

record if you would like to make an objection, so that that's

5

noted.

6

MR. WEST:

7

yesterday, so I'll —

8

MR. GARCIA:

9

THE COURT:

10

Okay.

11

jury.

Your Honor, I think I stated my objections

And I joined in it.
Okay. Anything else we need to do?

Well, we'll get the jury instructions and we'll get the

12

(Whereupon the jury was brought into the courtroom.)

13

THE COURT: We are on the record it the matter of the

14

State of Utah versus Joshua Phillips and Brandon Sandoval,

15

Cases 061907635 and 061907636. And the jury has now joined us.

16

You should have a copy of the additional Supplemental

17

Instructions. We will pick up where we left off, which was we

18

had completed reading through Instruction No. 18, which means

19

I'll pick iip with Instruction No. 19 and then the remainder of

20

those instructions.
As I indicated, we111 read the jury instructions and

21
22

then we'll hear closing arguments.

23

(Whereupon jury instructions given to the jury.)

24 I

THE COURT: Ms. Collins, the lecturn is yours for

25 | your closing arguments.

